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ABSTRACT
Neural networks are susceptible to data inference attacks such as
the model inversion attack and the membership inference attack,
where the attacker could infer the reconstruction and the mem-
bership of a data sample from the confidence scores predicted by
the target classifier. In this paper, we propose a common approach,
namely purification framework, to defend data inference attacks. It
purifies the confidence score vectors predicted by the target classi-
fier, with the goal of removing redundant information that could
be exploited by the attacker to perform the inferences. Specifically,
we design a purifier model which takes a confidence score vector
as input and reshapes it to meet the defense goals. It does not re-
train the target classifier. The purifier can be used to mitigate the
model inversion attack, the membership inference attack or both
attacks. We evaluate our approach on deep neural networks using
benchmark datasets. We show that the purification framework can
effectively defend the model inversion attack and the membership
inference attack, while introducing negligible utility loss to the
target classifier (e.g., less than 0.3% classification accuracy drop).
Moreover, we also empirically show that it is possible to defend
data inference attacks with negligible change to the generalization
ability of the classification function.
1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning has been widely adopted in a variety of applica-
tions, transforming many aspects of our daily life such as handling
users’ sensitive data. Machine learning itself is also been provided
as a service, e.g., machine-learning-as-a-service, by many platforms.
Users access these models through prediction APIs which return
a prediction score vector. Such vector is a probability distribution
over the possible classes and each score indicates the confidence
in predicting the corresponding class. The class with the largest
confidence is predicted as the label of the input data. In this paper,
we are interested in data inference attacks, notably membership
inference and model inversion that exploit such prediction scores to
threaten the privacy and security of machine learning.
A series of studies has indicated that the prediction scores of
black-box machine learning models could be exploited to perform
data inference attacks to get useful information about the data
on which the machine learning model operates [14, 20, 24, 35, 36,
47, 49, 60]. For examples, membership inference attack [24, 35,
36, 47, 49] and model inversion attack [14, 20, 60] are two of the
most important and exemplary ones. In a membership inference
attack, the adversary is asked to determine whether a given data
sample is in the target model’s training data or not according to
its confidence scores predicted by the target model. Specifically,
the adversary trains a binary classifier which takes the prediction
scores as input and predicts whether the data sample is a member
or non-member of the target model. In a model inversion attack, the
adversary aims at inferring information about the data sample from
the prediction scores such as the sensitive attributes [15, 19, 58]
or the reconstruction of the sample [14, 20, 60]. Recently, Yang
et al. [60] proposed an effective black-box model inversion attack
where the attacker leverages auxiliary knowledge to construct an
inversion model which can reconstruct the original input sample
from the prediction scores with high accuracy.
The main reason of why such data inference attacks work is
that the prediction scores contain not only confidence of classify-
ing the query data but also unwanted redundant information, i.e.,
membership information and inversion information, which could
be exploited to infer useful information about the query data. For
instance, the major cause of membership inference attack is that the
prediction scores of the target model are distinguishable for mem-
bers and non-members of the training data. Such distinguishability
leaks membership information to the attacker. Overfitting is be-
lieved to be one of the major reasons causing the distinguishability,
but is shown to be not the only one [49].
A number of approaches have been proposed to mitigate mem-
bership inference attack in the literature. These approaches mainly
leverage various regularization techniques to reduce overfitting,
such as L2 regularizer [49], dropout [47], model-stacking [47] and
min-max regularization [35]. However, they do not impose a di-
rect reduction of the distinguishability. Moreover, these defenses
require retraining the target model which is considered less ef-
ficient especially for complicated neural networks. Jia et al. [24]
recently proposed MemGuard which, instead of reducing overfit-
ting, transforms the prediction scores to an adversarial example to
evade the attacker’s membership classification. Although it does
not retrain the target model, the defense effectiveness is dependent
on the transferability [41] of adversarial examples, which might
not generally reduce the distinguishability of prediction scores. An-
other set of defenses use differential privacy mechanisms [1, 23, 48].
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These approaches can provide a theoretical guarantee of privacy
but impose a significant classification accuracy loss [35].
Most previous defense approaches of data inference attacks fo-
cused on the membership inference attack. Unfortunately, little has
been studied about the defense of model inversion attack.
In this paper, we propose a common purification framework to
defend data inference attacks by “purifying” the prediction scores.
The framework takes the prediction scores of a trained target model
as input and produces a purified version to satisfy one or both of
these defense goals: (I) preventing model inversion attack and (II)
preventing membership inference attack. The intuition is to remove
the redundant information hidden in the prediction scores which
could be exploited by the attacker. Specifically, in the model inver-
sion attack, the attacker exploits the redundant information to infer
a reconstruction of an input sample, while in the membership in-
ference attack, the attacker exploits the distinguishability between
the prediction scores on members and non-members to infer the
membership.
We achieve the purification framework by training a purifier,
which takes the confidence scores of the target model as input
and purifies them. An additional adversarial model is trained for
Defense Goal I (i.e., preventing model inversion), and an additional
discriminator is trained for Defense Goal II (i.e., preventing mem-
bership inference). The adversarial model and the discriminator can
be discarded after training. The purifier and the original classifier
will work as a black box to classify the query data. The purifier has
a similar structure as autoencoder [4] and thus can learn a latent
representation of a dataset. It is trained to optimize two loss func-
tions: a reconstruction loss of the original confidence scores and the
purified version, and a cross entropy loss of the purified version and
the originally predicted label. Such training process leads to a puri-
fier that not only captures the latent representation (features) of the
original confidence scores but also imposes minimized distortion
to them and the classification accuracy loss.
To achieve the Defense Goal I, we train the purifier by also
minimizing the redundant information in the prediction scores that
is useful for the attacker to infer the reconstruction of the input data.
Specifically, we anticipate an additional adversarial model which
adaptively performs model inversion attack against the purifier and
the purifier keeps updating the prediction scores to minimize the
inversion accuracy. Eventually, the adversarial model evolves to be
the supposedly strongest inversion model and the purifier purifies
the prediction scores with minimized useful information for the
mode inversion attack. We formulate such training as a min-max
game between the purifier and the adversarial model, and jointly
train them. The training data could be the same training set of the
target model or another set drawn from the same data distribution.
The purifier achieves the Defense Goal II by purifying the confi-
dence scores on members or non-members as if they were predicted
on non-members. This reduces the distinguishability of prediction
scores that could be exploited to infer the membership. We realize
it in two ways. First, we train the purifier on the validation set,
which is composed of non-member data in terms of the target clas-
sifier. The autoencoder structure of the purifier is able to capture
the latent features of the confidence scores on these non-members,
thus producing a non-member reconstruction for any confidence
scores. Second, to make the reconstruction more real, we adopt a
discriminator when training the purifier, which is a similar training
strategy as in the generative adversarial network [16]. The discrim-
inator is trained to distinguish whether a confidence score is really
predicted on non-member data or a reconstruction, and the purifier
learns to fool the discriminator to make mistakes. Eventually, the
purifier improves the reconstructed confidence scores.
The purifier can concurrently attain both defense goals when
we use the validation set to jointly train the purifier, the adversarial
model and the discriminator. The result of the joint training is
that, at the equilibrium point, the purifier can not only purify the
confidence scores as if they were predicted on non-members but
alsominimize the inversion accuracy of the corresponding strongest
inversion model. Besides the defenses, the purifier is trained to
minimize the distortion to the confidence scores as well as the
classification accuracy loss.
Our experimental results show that the purification framework
can effectively decrease the model inversion accuracy and the mem-
bership inference accuracy at the same time. For example, our
experimental results on the FaceScrub classifier [60] show that the
individual-specific facial features in the inverted facial images are
largely reduced. The defense performance against the membership
inference attack outperforms existing approaches on most of the
evaluated datasets. Moreover, our approach introduces negligible
utility loss. For example, the classification accuracy drop is within
0.3% on all evaluated datasets. We also empirically show that our
framework is effective because it removes redundant information
useful for the attacker, rather than changing the generalization
error of the target model.
Contributions. In summary, we make the following contribu-
tions in this paper.
• We propose an effective adversarial training approach to
mitigate the model inversion attack on classification mod-
els, by minimizing the useful information for the attacker
to infer the reconstruction of the input sample.
• We propose a defense approach of membership inference
attack by transforming the confidence score vector on any
data to behave as if it is predicted on non-member data.
This decreases the distinguishability of the prediction on
members vs. non-members.
• We propose a common purification framework to defend
data inference attacks including the model inversion attack
and membership inference attack. It purifies a confidence
score vector by removing the redundant information useful
for the attacker.
• We empirically show that it is possible to effectively miti-
gate data inference attacks with negligible change to the
generalization error of the classification function.
2 INFERENCE ATTACKS ON MACHINE
LEARNING
It has been shown that machine learning models are vulnerable to
various inference attacks [15, 49, 60, 61], which enables adversaries
to get useful information about the target model from only the
prediction APIs. Depending on the inference goals, these inference
attacks generally fall into two classes, i.e., model inference and
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data inference. Specifically, model inference aims at obtaining the
information about the target model itself such as its parameters and
architecture [37, 40, 54, 55]. Data inference, on the contrary, focuses
on extracting information about the data on which the target model
operates [2, 14, 15, 49, 57, 58, 60, 61]. In this paper, we concentrate
on two of the most important and exemplary data inference attacks,
notably membership inference attack [49] and model inversion
attack [14, 60]. In this section, we first introduce these two data
inference attacks and then introduce existing defenses. Finally, we
analyze the limitations of existing defense mechanisms.
2.1 Data Inference Attacks
Membership inference and model inversion attacks are two types
of data inference attacks that threaten the security and privacy of
machine learning. They differ in their inference goals
Membership Inference Attack. In the membership inference at-
tack, the attacker is asked to determine whether a given data record
is part of the training data of the target model [24, 30, 31, 36, 47, 49].
Confidence-based Attack [47, 49]. Shokri et al. [49] introduced
membership inference against black-boxmodels, where the attacker
has access only to the prediction scores of the target model. To infer
the membership, the attacker trains a binary classifier (also referred
to as attack model) which takes as input the confidence scores
of the target model on a given data sample and predicts the data
sample to be a member or non-member of the training dataset of
the target model. Prior to training the attack model, the attacker
trains a set of shadow models on an auxiliary dataset drawn from
the same data distribution as the target model’s training data to
replicate the target model. The attack model is then trained on the
confidence scores predicted by the shadow models instead of the
target model on the members and non-members of the shadow
models’ training data. Salem et al. [47] further showed that it is
sufficient to train only one shadow model to replicate the target
model for membership inference attack. Besides, they also showed
that ranking the elements in the confidence score vectors before
inputting them to the attack model could improve the inference
accuracy. For example, their experimental results show that only the
top one/three highest values in the confidence vector are sufficient
to result in effective membership inference. These results indicate
that the assumptions of membership inference attack could be
largely relaxed which might lead to more practical threats.
Confidence & Label-based Attack [35]. Nasr et al. [35] extended
the attack model by also taking the label information as input.
Their attack model is composed of three neural networks. The first
two networks operate on the confidence score vector and the one-
hot encoded label respectively. They have the same size of input
dimension, i.e., the number of classes of the target model. The third
network operates on the concatenation of the output of the first
two networks and predicts the membership. They assume that the
attacker has a subset of the members and non-members of the target
model’s training data, and thus they do not train shadow models.
More settings of membership inference attack have been studied
in the literature. For examples, Nasr et al. [36] proposed member-
ship inference attack in the white-box setting, where the attacker
computes the gradients of the white-box target model with respect
to the given data sample as features for membership inference.
There are also research efforts on membership inference attack in
federated learning [32, 36] and against generative models [18]. In
this paper, we consider membership inference attack in the black-
box setting against standalone centralized classification models.
Model Inversion Attack. Model inversion aims to reconstruct
the input data from its confidence scores predicted by the target
model. Fredrikson et al. [14] proposed a method to infer a represen-
tative sample of a training class against a white-box target model.
It casts the inversion task as an optimization problem in the input
domain to find the best representative for a given class.
Yang et al. [60] recently proposed a model inversion attack in
the black-box setting. Specifically, they train a separate inversion
model on an auxiliary dataset which acts as the inverse of the
target model. The inversion model takes the confidence scores of
the target model as input and tries to reconstruct the original input
data. Their experimental results showed significant improvement of
the inversion accuracy over previous works. They also performed
accurate inversion attacks against real-world commercial facial
recognition services.
Some othermethodswere proposed to infer sensitive attributes [15,
19, 58, 63] or statistical information [2] about the training data
instead of reconstructing the specific input data. There are also
studies [20] of inversion attack in the setting of federated learning
where the attacker has white-box access to the global model. In this
paper, we concentrate on model inversion attack that aims to re-
construct the input data in the black-box setting against standalone
centralized classification models.
2.2 Defenses against Data Inference Attacks
Previous defense mechanisms against data inference attacks are
mostly limited to mitigating membership inference attack. Unfortu-
nately, little has been studied about the defense of model inversion
attack on classification models. Therefore, we introduce existing
defenses against membership inference attack as typical examples
in the literature defending data inference attacks.
Overfitting, i.e., machine learning models behave more confi-
dently on their training data (members) than others, is believed
to be one of the major reasons that make the confidence scores
distinguishable for members and non-members [49]. When a model
overfits on training data (i.e., members), the confidence scores of the
model on members and non-members exhibit significantly different
patterns which makes it easier for the attacker to distinguish them.
In light of this, a number of studies make use of various regulariza-
tion techniques and ensemble learning to reduce overfitting.
• L2-Regularizer [49]. The L2 regularizer is an L2 norm of the
model parameters added as a weighted penalty term to the
original loss function. In [49], the authors showed that us-
ing L2-regularizer to train the target model can help mitigate
membership inference attack.
• Dropout [47]. Dropout is another technique used to regularize
neural networks [53]. It works by dropping a neuron with
a certain probability during the network training. Salem et
al. [47] used dropout to mitigate the membership inference
attack.
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• Min-Max Game [35]. Nasr et al. [35] proposed to add an ad-
versarial regularizer to the original loss function of the target
model such that the target model is trained to minimize the
prediction loss and to also maximize the membership privacy.
The training process is formulated as a min-max optimization
problem.
• Model Stacking [47]. Model stacking is essentially an ensemble
approach which combines multiple simple classifiers as a com-
plicated one to make the final prediction [39, 44]. It is often
used as a way of reducing overfitting [51]. Salem et al. [47]
leveraged model stacking to mitigate membership inference
attack.
MemGuard [24]. While most existing defenses focus on reducing
overfitting to mitigate membership inference attack, Jia et al. [24]
studied to transform the confidence score vector into an adversarial
example to evade the membership classification of the attack model.
Specifically, the defender adds carefully-crafted noise to the confi-
dence score vector predicted by the target model so as to turn it into
an adversarial example. To this end, the defender first trains his own
“attack model” which works similarly as the attacker’s attack model,
and thus he can craft the adversarial example against his attack
model in a white-box manner. Such adversarial example is likely to
also evade the membership classification of the attacker’s attack
model due to the transferability of adversarial examples [9, 41, 42].
Differential Privacy. Differential privacy [13] is a widely used
privacy-preserving technique. A number of studies have explored
differential privacy to mitigate membership inference attack. For
example, some methods add noise to the objective function of the
model [8, 23, 26], while others add noise to the gradient of the
model during minimizing the objective function [1, 5, 52, 56, 62].
Differential privacy is able to provide theoretical privacy guarantee
but at the cost of significant loss of classification accuracy [28, 35].
2.3 Limitations of Existing Defenses
Previous studies of defense mechanisms against the membership
inference attack did not discuss their impact on the model inversion
attack which is one of the important data inference attacks that
threaten the security and privacy of machine learning data. To
the best of our knowledge, no known defense method of both
membership inference and model inversion attacks is available.
It is shown that overfitting is not the only reason that causes
membership inference attack [49]. Even if different machine learn-
ing models are overfitted to the same degree, they could leak differ-
ent amounts of membership information. Specifically, due to their
different structures, they might “remember” different amounts of
information about their training data. Actually, the attacker ex-
ploits the information about how the target model’s confidence
scores distinguish members from non-members to launch member-
ship inference attack [49]. As what existing defense mechanisms
already did, reducing overfitting contributes to the decrease of such
distinguishability. However, such defense methods could be more
effective if the distinguishability can be directly reduced.
The confidence scores of a machine learning classifier tell more
useful information about the query data beyond the predicted la-
bel. Therefore, one defense mechanism should introduce negligible
distortion to them. Most of previous defenses retrain the target
model which not only disorganizes the confidence scores of the
target model but also becomes inefficient especially for large and
complicated neural networks. MemGuard [24] is designed to have a
hyper-parameter to control the distortion of the confidence scores.
However, the effectiveness of this defense method is dependent on
the transferability [41] of adversarial examples. Besides, turning
the confidence score vector into an adversarial example might not
lead to a reduction of the general distinguishability between mem-
bers and non-members. Crafting an adversarial example for each
query data is considered less efficient compared to other defense
mechanisms [28] in the testing phase.
Differential privacy, though provides a theoretical guarantee of
privacy, has a significant impact on the classification accuracy loss
of the target model compared with other defense mechanisms [35].
Although differential privacy prevents an attacker from gaining
additional information by including or excluding an individual data
record, the information leaked from the released prediction scores
(through which an attacker can perform model inversion attack) is
not discussed in previous studies.
3 PROBLEM FORMULATION
We focus on the supervised learning, more specifically, on training
classification models (classifiers) using neural networks [27]. We
have three parties in our problem, namely model owner, attacker
and defender. The model owner trains a machine learning classifier
on its private training dataset. We refer to this classifier as target
classifier. The attacker aims to launch data inference attacks against
the target classifier. The defender aims to provide protection to the
target classifier against the attacker.
3.1 Model Owner
The model owner trains a machine learning classifier F on his
private training dataset Dtrain . He also has a validation dataset
Dval to test whether F functions properly. Both Dtrain and Dval
are drawn from the same underlying data distribution px (x). The
classifier F is trained with the goal of making predictions on unseen
data which we refer to as test dataset Dtest . Let x represent the
data drawn from px , and y be the vectorized class of x. The training
objective is to find a function Fw to well approximate the relation
between each data point (x, y). Formally, we have:
F : x 7→ y
The training process is to optimize an objective function L(F ) and
terminates typically when the classification accuracy on the valida-
tion set Dval achieves the best [7]. The model owner releases the
trained classifier F as a black box, for example, as a cloud service,
and provides prediction APIs to users. The users can query F with
their own data sample x ∈ Dtest through the prediction APIs. The
classifier F returns a prediction score vector F (x) to the users. The
prediction score vector is a probability distribution of the classi-
fier’s confidence over all the possible classes. For example, the i-th
element F (x)i is the probability of the data x belonging to class i .
We usually take the class with the maximum probability to be the
predicted label of the data x.
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3.2 Attacker
The attacker aims at performing data inference attacks against
the target classifier F . We consider that the classifier F works as a
black-box “oracle” to the attacker, i.e., the attacker can only query
F with his data sample x and obtain the prediction scores F (x). The
attacker is also assumed to have auxiliary information A such as
the ground-truth label of x and a set of data samples dawn from a
similar data distribution pa as the target classifier’s training data
distribution px . Formally, given a prediction vector F (x) on some
victim data point x, the attacker wants to find an attack function
A(F (x),O(F ),A) in the following:
A(F (x),O(F ),A) =
{
m ∈ {0, 1}, membership inference
x˜, model inversion
(1)
where O(F ) represents the attacker’s black-box access to the oracle
classifier F ,m denotes the membership of the victim data x, and
x˜ is the reconstruction of x . The membershipm has two possible
values: 0 and 1, wherem = 1 indicates that x is a member of the
target classifier’s training data whilem = 0 means non-member.
3.3 Defender
The defender protects the target classifier from data inference at-
tacks. It could be the model owner or a trusted third party who
has access to the target classifier’s prediction score vectors and
the validation dataset Dval . For any query to the target classifier
from users, the defender modifies the prediction score vector of the
target classifier with the goal of removing redundant information
that the attacker could exploit to perform data inference attacks
before returning it to users. The attacker has access only to the
modified prediction scores from the defender. In particular, the
defender wants to achieve the following goals:
• Defense Goal. The defender aims to achieve one or both
of these defense goals. (Defense Goal I) The defender
wants to make the error of A on reconstructing the in-
put data x large enough such that the attacker is unable
to infer anything specific about x from the x˜. (Defense
Goal II) The defender wants to make the attack function
A inaccurate at inferring the membership of a given data
sample.
• Utility Goal. The defender aims to introduce insignificant
distortion to the confidence score vectors of the target
classifier as well as negligible classification accuracy loss.
• Efficiency Goal. The defense mechanism should intro-
duce negligible time overhead to deploy and use.
4 APPROACH: PURIFICATION FRAMEWORK
We propose a purification framework to defend data inference at-
tacks, i.e., model inversion attack and membership inference attack,
by purifying the confidence scores of the target classifier such that
the attacker could not exploit the purified confidence scores to
infer inversion and membership information about the data. The
purification framework does not tamper with the training process
of the target classifier.
The purification framework is designed towards achieving the
defense, utility and efficiency goals. The architecture of the pu-
rification framework for each defense goal is shown in Figure 1.
The common component of the purification framework is a purifier
G for all defense goals. It takes the confidence score vector F (x)
of the target classifier F as input and modifies it such that the re-
dundant membership and inversion information is removed while
introducing negligible distortion to F (x) and negligible classifica-
tion accuracy loss. An additional adversarial model H is trained for
the Defense Goal I and an additional discriminator I is trained for
the Defense Goal II. After training, H and I can be discarded. The
purifier G and the target classifier F will work as a black box to
classify the query data.
4.1 Base of Purification: Purifier G
The purifier G is the base of the purification framework, which
preserves the utility of the target classifier F and can be extended to
support the defense of data inference attacks with the help of H or
(and) I . Specifically,G has a similar architecture as autoencoder [4]
as shown in Figure 2. It is able to learn to copy its input to its output,
in which process it learns the latent representation (features) for a
set of confidence score vectors. In order to minimize the distortion
to F (x) and the classification accuracy loss caused byG , we trainG
to optimize the following objective function.
min
G
L(G)1 = E
x∼px (x)
[R(G(F (x)), F (x))
+ αL(G(F (x), argmax F (x)))]
(2)
where R is a reconstruction loss function (we use L2 norm) and L
is the cross entropy loss function.
Throughout the joint optimization of the two loss functions, the
purifierG is encouraged to minimize the distortion introduced by
G(F (x)) to F (x) as indicated in R. On the other hand, G(F (x)) will
maximally preserve the original classification accuracy becauseG
is trained to predict the label predicted by F as indicated in L. The
parameter α controls the balance of the two loss functions during
optimization. As a result, the purifier G achieves our utility goal.
4.2 Defense Goal I: Joint G and H
When we jointly train the purifier G and an additional adversarial
model H in an adversarial training process, the purifier G can be
extended to prevent the model inversion attack, i.e., achieving the
Defense Goal I. The training data could be a dataset drawn from
px (x) such as Dtrain or Dval . Figure 1(a) presents the architecture
of the purification framework.
In the model inversion attack, the attack function A could be
constructed in any unexpected ways with the goal of bypassing a
particular defense mechanism. In response to this, we propose to
anticipate a supposedly strongest inversion function H and trainG
to minimize the inversion accuracy of H . Intuitively, the attacker
could not design a better attack function A than H which is already
prepared during the training of G. We model such training process
as a min-max adversarial game betweenG and H which is a similar
way as many adversarial processes for machine learning [11, 16,
33, 35]. Formally, H is trained to optimize the following training
objective.
max
H
L(H ) = E
x∼px (x)
[−R(x,H (G(F (x))))] (3)
where R is the reconstruction loss function which is L2 norm in our
work. This is exactly the same training objective of the attacker’s
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xD
Target Classifier F
F (x)
Purifier G
minE[L1 + αL2 + λL4]
G(F (x))
Adversarial Model H
maxE[L4]
H (G(F (x)))
L4 = −R(x, H (G(F (x))))
x
L1 = R(G(F (x)), F (x))
L2 = L(G (F (x)), argmax F (x))
(a) Defense Goal I: model inversion
x
Dval
Target Classifier F
F (x)
Purifier G
minE[L1 + αL2 + βL3]
G(F (x))
Discriminator I
maxE[L5]
I (G(F (x)))
L3 = log(1 − I (G(F (x))))
L5 = log(I (F (x))) + L3
(b) Defense Goal II: membership inference
x
Dval
Target Classifier F
F (x)
Purifier G
minE[L1 + αL2 + βL3 + λL4]
G(F (x))
Adversarial Model H
maxE[L4]
Discriminator I
maxE[L5]
H (G(F (x))) I (G(F (x)))
(c) Defense Goal I and II
Figure 1: Architecture of the purification framework for different defense goals. The base common component of the purifica-
tion frameworks is the purifierG. It has a similar structure as autoencoder as shown in Figure 2 and thus can be used to learn
the distribution of the confidence score vector F (x). The target classifier F is fixed during training G. After training, G and F
will work as a black box (i.e., the yellow part) to classify query data.
𝐸 𝐷𝐹(𝒙) 𝑟 (𝐹(𝒙)
𝐸 𝐷𝒚 𝑟 *𝒚
𝐸 𝐷𝐹(𝒙) 𝑟 𝐺(𝐹(𝒙))
Purifier 𝐺
Figure 2: Architecture of purifierG. It consists of an encoder
E which maps the confidence score vector F (x) predicted by
F to a latent representation r and a decoder D which maps r
to a reconstruction G(F (x)).
inversion model in the model inversion attack [60]. The purifier
G learns to minimize the inversion accuracy by optimizing the
following objective function.
min
G
L(G)2 = E
x∼px (x)
[L(G)1 − λR(x,H (G(F (x))))] (4)
where λ is a parameter that controls the trade-off between L(G)1
and R. This training objective encourages G to not only maintain
the utility as represented by L(G)1 but also maximize the inversion
error of H .
The two objective functions (i.e., function 3 and 4) need to be
solved jointly to find the equilibrium point. Therefore, we formalize
them in one min-max optimization problem.
min
G
max
H
L(G,H ) = E
x∼px (x)
[L(G)1 − λR(x,H (G(F (x))))] (5)
The purifierG and the adversarial modelH are trained alternatively
to find the best responses against each other in one mini-batch.
4.3 Defense Goal II: Joint G and I
Whenwe jointly train the purifierG and an additional discriminator
I on the defender’s validation dataset Dval (i.e., non-member data),
the purifierG can be extended to prevent the membership inference
attack, i.e., achieving the Defense Goal II. Figure 1(b) presents the
architecture of the purification framework.
The intuition of defending the membership inference attack is to,
for every query data x, make the purified G(F (x)) behave as if it is
predicted on a non-member sample. Hence, the attacker could not
find an attack function A to effectively distinguish its membership.
To this end, we train G on Dval which are non-members of F ’s
training data. G is able to learn the latent representation of F ’s
confidence scores on these non-members because of its autoencoder
structure. Any F (x) is expected be purified to G(F (x)) behaving as
if predicted on non-member data. To further make G(F (x)) more
real to evade the attacker’s membership classification, we jointly
train G with a discriminator I in an adversarial training process.
Specifically, I is trained to distinguish real F (x) and fake G(F (x))
by optimizing the following objective function.
max
I
L(I ) = E
x∼pv (x)
[log I (F (x)) + log(1 − I (G(F (x))))] (6)
where pv (x) represent the conditional probability of x for samples
in Dval . The purifierG aims to fool I to misclassifyG(F (x)) as real.
Formally, we have the following objective function to train G.
min
G
L(G)3 = E
x∼pv (x)
[L(G)1 + β log(1 − I (G(F (x))))] (7)
where β is a parameter controlling the importance of the loss func-
tions during training.
We formalize the two objective functions (i.e., function 6 and 7)
in one min-max optimization problem to jointly train G and I to
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Table 1: Data allocation. A dataset is divided into training set
D1 of the target classifier, validation setD2 and test setD3. In
membership inference attacks, we assume that the attacker
has access to a subset DA of D1 and a subset D
′A of D3.
Dataset D1 D2 D3 DA D
′A
CIFAR10 50,000 5,000 5,000 25,000 2,500
Purchase100 20,000 20,000 20,000 10,000 10,000
FaceScrub530 30,000 10,000 8,000 15,000 4,000
find the equilibrium point.
min
G
max
I
L(G, I ) = E
x∼pv (x)
[L(G)1 + β log I (F (x))
+ β(log(1 − I (G(F (x)))))]
(8)
Similarly, the purifier G and the discriminator I are trained alter-
natively in one mini-batch to find the best responses against each
other. Note that, the discriminator I is used to distinguish real or
fake confidence scores and the function 8 encouragesG to generate
real confidence scores as if they were predicted on non-members.
This is different from the min-max game in [35] where the inference
model is used to classify the membership from the target classifier’s
predictions and the target classifier is retrained on the original
Dtrain and a reference set.
4.4 Defense Goal I & II: Joint G, H and I
The purifier G can be extended to defend both model inversion
attack and membership inference attack if we jointly trainG ,H and
I on the validation dataset Dval (i.e., non-member data). Figure 1(c)
presents the architecture. We formalize the joint training of the
three models in a min-max-max optimization problem.
min
G
max
H
max
I
L(G, H, I ) = E
x∼pv (x)
[L(G)1 − λR(x, H (G(F (x))))
+ β (log I (F (x)) + log(1 − I (G(F (x)))))]
(9)
The result of this optimization is a purifierG that will purify F (x) to
G(F (x)) such that the redundant information useful for the attacker
to perform data inferences is largely reduced. Moreover, the classi-
fication accuracy loss and the distortion to F (x) is minimized. The
time overhead for each query is introduced by the computation of
G which is a single forward pass of a much smaller neural network
than the original F . The time overhead is considered negligible and
thus we achieve the efficiency.
5 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we evaluate our purification framework in defend-
ing model inversion attack and membership inference attack. We
implement our framework using PyTorch1. We also compare our
method with existing methods from the defense, utility and effi-
ciency perspectives.
5.1 Experimental Setup
Datasets
We use 3 datasets which are widely adopted in previous works
on model inversion [60] and membership inference [24, 47, 49].
1https://pytorch.org/
CIFAR10 [28, 47, 49]. It is a machine learning benchmark dataset
for evaluating image recognition algorithms. It consists of 60,000
color images, each of size 32 x 32. The dataset has 10 classes, where
each class represents an object (e.g., airplane, car, etc.)
Purchase100 [28, 35, 47, 49]. This dataset is based on Kaggle’s
“acquired valued shopper” challenge2. We used the preprocessed
and simplified version of this dataset [49]. It is composed of 197,324
data records and each data record has 600 binary features. The
dataset is clustered into 100 classes.
FaceScrub530 [60]. This dataset consists of URLs for 100,000 im-
ages of 530 individuals.We obtained the preprocessed and simplified
version of this dataset from [60] which has 48,579 facial images and
each image is resized to 64 × 64.
Table 1 presents the data allocation in our experiments. We di-
vide each dataset into the target classifier’s training set D1, the
validation set D2 and the test set D3. They have no overlap with
each other. In membership inference attacks, we assume that the
attacker has access to a subset DA of D1 and a subset D
′A of D3.
Nonetheless, whether the attacker has knowledge of the member-
ship labels of DA and D′A depends on whether the attacker trains
shadow models. Specifically, if the attacker trains shadow models,
he is assumed to not know the membership labels, and use half
of DA and D′A to train them. The attack model is trained on the
whole DA and D′A with the shadow models’ training data labeled
as members. Otherwise, the attacker is assumed to have the mem-
bership labels and can directly query the target classifier to get the
confidence scores for members and non-members. In the model
inversion attack, for the FaceScrub530 classifier, the attacker uses a
CelebA dataset as the auxiliary dataset to train the inversion model,
which is the same setting in [60]. For other classifiers, the attacker
samples 80% from D1, D2 and D3 respectively to form the auxiliary
dataset and use the other 20% data to test the inversion accuracy.
Target Classifier
For the CIFAR10 dataset, we use the DenseNet121 architec-
ture [22], which is also used in [28, 35]. We train our classifier
with Stochastic gradient descent(SGD) optimizer for 350 epochs
with learning rate 0.1 from epoch 0 to 150, 0.01 from 150 to 250,
and 0.001 from 250 to 350. The classifier is regularized with L2
regularizaiton(5e-4). For the Purchase100 dataset, we use the same
model and the same training strategy as in [35] to train the target
classifier. It is a 4-layer fully connected neural network. For the Face-
Scrub530 dataset, we use the same convolutional neural network
and the same training strategy as in [60] to train the target classifier.
Purification Framework
The purification framework consists of the purifier, the adver-
sarial model and the discriminator.
Purifier.We use an autoencoder structure to implement the puri-
fier. It has the layer size [10, 7, 4, 7, 10] for CIFAR10, [100, 50, 20, 10,
20, 50, 100] for Purchase100 and [530, 200, 530] for FaceScrub530.
We use the ReLU activation function and batch normalization in
every hidden layer of all the purifier models. We train the Pur-
chase100 purifier for 200 epochs and others for 50 epochs. We use
2https://www.kaggle.com/c/acquire-valued-shoppers-challenge/data
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the Adam optimizer with learning rate 0.01 for CIFAR10, 0.0001 for
Purchase100 and 0.0005 for Facescrub530.
Adversarial Model. We use different adversarial models for dif-
ferent datasets. For FaceScrub530, we use the same model as [60],
which consists of 5 transposed CNN blocks. For CIFAR10, we re-
duce 1 transposed CNN blocks from the FaceScrub530 adversarial
model and the model consists of 4 transposed CNN blocks. For Pur-
chase100, we use a multi-layer perceptron of size [100, 512, 1024,
600]. Each hidden layer has a ReLU activation function and the
output layer has a Sigmoid activation function. We use the Adam
optimizer with learning rate 0.0002 for all the adversarial models.
Discriminator.We use a similar structure as the attack model in
[35] to build the discriminator. Specifically, it consists of three neu-
ral networks. The first neural network operates on the confidence
score vector and has the size of [d , 1024, 512, 64] whered is the input
dimension. The second neural network takes the one-hot encoded
label as input and has the size of [d , 512, 64]. The third network
takes the concatenation of the output of the first two networks
as input and produces a single value indicating whether the input
confidence score vector and label are real or fake. We use the Adam
optimizer with learning rate 0.0002 to train the discriminator model.
Data Inference Attacks
In our experiments, we consider the followingmodel inversion at-
tack and membership inference attacks as introduced in Section 2.1.
Adversarialmodel inversion attack [60].We adopt the recently
proposed black-box model inversion attack [60], where the attacker
trains an inversion model to infer the reconstruction of the input
sample. We use the same model architecture as in [60] to train the
inversion model for FaceScrub530 dataset. The inversion model was
trained on the CelebA dataset which is the same auxiliary dataset
used in [60].
Mlleaks attack [47]. This is a confidence-based membership infer-
ence attack, where the attacker has no knowledge of the member-
ship labels of DA and D′A and thus has to train a shadow model to
replicate the target classifier and then trains the attack model based
on the confidence scores of the shadow model. To consider the
strongest attack, we assume that the shadow model has the same
architecture as the target classifier. We use a multilayer perceptron
with a 128-unit hidden layer and a sigmoid output layer to train
the attack model. We use the Adam optimizer with learning rate
0.001. The number of training epochs is set to 50 for each dataset.
Mlleaks-a attack [47]. This is an adaptive version of the Mlleaks
attack, where the attacker is assumed to know the defender’s pu-
rification framework. Hence, he can train his own purification
framework on D2 to increase the attack accuracy.
NSH attack [35]. This is a confidence & label-based membership
inference attack proposed by Nasr, Shokri and Houmansadr [35].
The attacker is assumed to have the knowledge of the member-
ship labels of DA and D′A, and thus can directly query the target
classifier to get the confidence score vectors of members and non-
members without training the shadow model. We use the same
attack model as in [35] to implement this attack. During the train-
ing of the attack model, we make sure every training batch has the
same number of member and non-member instances to prevent the
attack model to be biased toward one side as [35] did.
Existing Defenses
We compare our approach with the following existing defenses
as introduced in Section 2.1, which represent the state-of-the-art
defense methods in the literature.
Min-Max [35].We use the open-source code of [35] to implement
the Min-Max defense. The number of training epochs for both the
classification model and the inference model is the same as the
number we use to train the target classifier.
MemGuard [24].We adopt the open-source code of [24] to imple-
ment this defense method. Specifically, the defense classifier used
in this method consists of three hidden layers [256, 128, 64] and
uses ReLU in hidden layers and Sigmoid in the output layer.
Model-Stacking [47]. This method ensembles two layers of mod-
els. The first layer combines two models, where we use the same
architecture as the target classifier as the first model and use ran-
dom forest for Purchase100 and VGG19 [50] for FaceScrub530 and
CIFAR10 as the second model. The second layer is a logistic re-
gression model for Purchase100 and FaceScrub530, and a neural
network with a single hidden layer of size 128 for CIFAR10.
Metrics
We use the following metrics to measure the utility, defense
performance and efficiency of a defense method.
Classification Accuracy. It is measured on the training set D1
and the test set D3 of the target classifier. It reflects how good the
target classifier is at the classification task.
Confidence Score Distortion.We measure the confidence score
distortion introduced by a defense method by computing the L1
norm of the distance between the original confidence score vector
predicted by the target classifier and the new confidence score
vector after the defense method is applied.
Membership Inference Accuracy. This is the classification accu-
racy of the attacker’s attack model in predicting the membership
of input samples. It is measured on D1 − DA (i.e., members) and
D3 − D′A (i.e., non-members).
Inversion Error. We measure the inversion error by computing
the mean squared error between the original input sample and the
reconstructed sample. For the FaceScrub530 classifier, it is measured
on D1 and D3. For other classifiers, it is measured on the 20% of D1
and D3 respectively.
Time Overhead.We measure the efficiency of a defense method
by reporting the extra time introduced by deploying and using
the defense method. It includes the additional training time of any
models introduced by the method and the additional test time when
classifying a query data.
5.2 Experimental Results
To compare the performance of our approach and existing ap-
proaches, we present the utility, defense performance, efficiency
of the original target classifier without any defense in Table 2 (1st
row in each dataset).
Defense Goal I: Preventing Model Inversion Attack
We apply the purification framework in Figure 1(a) to mitigate
the adversarial model inversion attack against the FaceScrub530
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Table 2: Comprehensive results of the utility, defense performance and efficiency of evaluated defense methods.
Dataset Defense Utility Model Inversion Membership Inference Efficiency
Train acc. Test acc. Conf. dist. Recon. error NSH Mlleaks Mlleaks-a Train (h) Test (s)
CIFAR10
None 99.99% 95.92% 0 1.4438 56.03% 56.26% – 0 0
Purifier(1,1,1) 100.00% 95.64% 0.1110 1.4937 52.89% 51.12% 51.72% 0.92 6.90e-4
Min-Max 97.43% 88.78% 0.3396 1.4652 55.05% 52.77% – 62.71 5.88e-4
MemGuard 99.99% 95.92% 0.0418 1.4397 51.71% 50.86% – 4.89 2.57
Model-Stacking 95.80% 92.12% 0.2230 1.4723 51.93% 51.01% – 6.44 1.38e-3
Purchase100
None 99.96% 84.36% 0 0.1426 70.36% 64.43% – 0 0
Purifier(1,1,1) 100.00% 84.19% 0.1842 0.1518 58.81% 51.40% 52.74% 1.73 1.50e-4
Min-Max 94.12% 79.90% 0.4873 0.1416 56.85% 55.85% – 16.00 1.80e-5
MemGuard 100.00% 84.36% 0.1444 0.1426 59.53% 52.77% – 0.44 2.46
Model-Stacking 81.84% 69.68% 0.8519 0.1472 61.16% 55.53% – 0.09 2.70e-4
FaceScrub530
None 100.00% 77.68% 0 0.0114 69.34% 75.04% – 0 0
Purifier(1,1,1) 100.00% 77.60% 0.2558 0.0447 58.91% 60.84% 60.80% 0.92 4.25e-3
Min-Max 83.43% 54.91% 0.9821 0.0215 61.75% 61.94% – 1.82 1.79e-4
MemGuard 100.00% 77.68% 0.1115 – 61.97% 67.29% – 1.54 3.69
Model-Stacking 86.30% 57.05% 1.2635 0.0417 62.00% 51.86% – 1.98 9.18e-4
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Figure 3: Effect of different defenses on defending model in-
version attack against the FaceScrub530 classifier. Row 2-6
show the inversion results using our defense approach.
dataset. We jointly train the purifier and the adversarial model with
α = 1 and λ = 1 on D1 and D2 respectively. We choose two archi-
tectures H and H ′ to train the adversarial model. Compared to H ,
H ′ has an extra transposed convolutional layer with batch normal-
ization and Tanh activation function. Figure 3 (row 1-5) shows the
inversion results on the FaceScrub530 dataset with and without de-
fense. We can see that, without defense, the attacker can infer a very
accurate reconstruction of the facial images. When the purification
framework is applied, the inversion results are more like “average”
faces and the useful information about the specific individuals is
significantly reduced. Table 4 shows the quantified inversion error
and the utility loss introduced by purifier. The inversion error is
significantly increased by a factor of almost 4 compared to the in-
version error without defense. Besides, the maximum classification
accuracy loss is only 0.18% and the average confidence score distor-
tion 0.2743 is considered negligible. From the results, it is clear that
our approach can effectively prevent the model inversion attack
and introduce negligible utility loss.
Defense Goal II: Preventing Membership Inference Attack
The purification framework can be used to prevent the mem-
bership inference attack when we jointly train the purifier and the
discriminator on the validation dataset D2 as shown in Figure 1(b).
We set α = 1 and β = 1. We perform the NSH attack, Mlleaks attack
and Mlleaks-a attack against the target classifier with and without
our defense. Table 5 presents the results of these attacks against
our framework. The classification accuracy is dropped less than
0.3%, and the membership inference accuracy of these attacks is
significantly reduced. For instances, the membership inference ac-
curacy of NSH attack is dropped by around 12% for the Purchase100
classifier, by 9% for the FaceScrub530 classifier and to almost 50%
for the CIFAR10 classifier. The inference accuracy of Mlleaks attack
is dropped by around 15% for the CIFAR10 and FaceScrub530 clas-
sifiers and by 12% for the Purchase100 classifier. Interestingly, even
though the attacker knows that the target classifier is protected by
the purification framework and performs the adaptive attack, i.e.,
Mlleaks-a attack, the inference accuracy is still equivalent to that of
the non-adaptive attack for CIFAR10 and FaceScrub530 classifiers
and is increased less than 3% for the Purchase100 classifier. These
results demonstrate that our approach can significantly mitigate
the membership inference attack with negligible utility loss.
Defense Goal I & II: Preventing Both Attacks
To prevent both the mode inversion attack and the membership
inference attack, we jointly train the purifier, the adversarial model
9
Table 3: Effect of the size of the validation set D2 on the
defense performance of our approach. The numbers are re-
ported on Purchase100 dataset.
D2 size Classification Conf. dist. Inver. error NSH Mlleaks Mlleaks-a
5,000 69.50% 0.494224 0.152091 59.59% 52.46% 54.33%
10,000 83.36% 0.195250 0.152222 59.21% 52.80% 54.85%
20,000 84.19% 0.184203 0.151805 58.81% 51.40% 52.74%
40,000 84.24% 0.167419 0.151398 58.33% 52.81% 54.17%
Table 4: Inversion results of using different architectures
to train the adversarial model on the FaceScrub530 dataset
when the purification framework is used to achieve Defense
Goal I (preventing model inversion attack).
Model Train Set Classification Acc. Conf. dist. Inversion error
None - 77.68% - 0.011448
H D1 77.65% 0.289042 0.043507
H D2 77.54% 0.256243 0.043517
H ′ D1 77.65% 0.276290 0.042705
H ′ D2 77.50% 0.275518 0.043650
Table 5: Membership inference results on different datasets
when the purification framework is used to achieve Defense
Goal II (preventing membership inference attack).
Dataset Classification Conf. dist. NSH Mlleaks Mlleaks-a
CIFAR10 95.64% 0.056833 52.65% 51.79% 52.00%
Purchase100 84.10% 0.170126 59.88% 52.52% 55.32%
FaceScrub530 77.44% 0.280228 60.51% 59.07% 60.18%
and the discriminator on the validation set D2 as shown in Fig-
ure 1(c). We present the defense performance against both attacks
in Table 2. For all datasets, we set α = 1, β = 1 and λ = 1. We
can see that the classification accuracy, i.e., training accuracy and
test accuracy is dropped within 0.3% on the three target classifiers.
The introduced confidence distortion is reasonably small, especially
when compared with existing defense methods. The defense perfor-
mance against both attacks is equivalent to the performance when
the purification framework is applied to prevent each individual
attack. For instance, the inversion error is significantly increased,
for example, by a factor of 4 for the FaceScrub530 classifier, which
can be visually justified in Figure 3 (6th row), where the attacker
cannot infer anything useful about the specific individuals. These
results show that the purification framework is effective in defend-
ing both the model inversion attack and the membership inference
attack with equivalent performance when applied to prevent each
individual attack.
Next, we evaluate the effect of the size of the validation set D2
on the defense performance. We use Purchase100 as an illustration
example. We vary the size of D2 from 5,000 to 40,000 and present
the defense performance of the purification framework in Table 3.
We set α = 1, β = 1, λ = 1 for all D2 sizes. It is worth noting
that, when the D2 size increases, both the utility loss and the NSH
attack accuracy decrease. This is because moreD2 contributes more
classification and non-member information to the purifier and the
discriminator to learn such that the purified confidence scores be-
have more like non-member data with less utility loss. However,
such effect on the Mlleaks attacks is not significant because the at-
tacker has to train a shadow model to replicate the target classifier,
which introduces some level of randomness to the attack accuracy.
Another finding is that the inversion error slightly decreases as D2
size increases. We believe that it is because the parameters (α = 1,
β = 1, λ = 1) might not fit the larger D2 size. By increasing λ, the
inversion error is expected to increase.
Data Inference and Generalization
We further study the relation between data inference and the
generalization ability of the model. We plot the cumulative distri-
bution function of the target classifier’s generalization error over
different classes in Figure 4. The curves that lean towards left have
a smaller generalization error. We compare the generalization error
of the target classifier with and without defense. As it is shown,
our approach introduces insignificant change to the generalization
error of the target classifier. The same conclusion can be reached
in Table 2, where the training accuracy and test accuracy are pre-
served after a purifier is applied. This result demonstrates that it is
possible to effectively mitigate data inference attacks without signif-
icantly changing the generalization ability of the target model. Our
purification framework, rather than reducing the generalization
error of the target classifier (i.e., reducing overfitting) as existing
defense methods did, purifies the confidence scores by removing
the unwanted redundant information that the attacker could exploit
to infer useful information about the query data.
Reduction of Redundant Information in Confidence Scores
The attacker exploits the distinguishable statistical information
to infer the membership of a query data [49], and exploits the redun-
dant information that is sensitive to the input sample to infer the
reconstruction of the query data [60]. Therefore, we measure how
much the two types of information are reduced in the confidence
scores by our approach such that the attacker could not infer useful
information from them.
We investigate the indistinguishability of the confidence scores
on members and non-members by plotting the histogram of the tar-
get classifier’s confidence in predicting the correct class in Figure 6
and plotting the histogram of the prediction uncertainty in Figure 7.
The prediction uncertainty is measured as the normalized entropy
−1
log(k )
∑
i yˆi log(yˆi ) of the confidence vector y = F (x), where k is
the number of classes. In both figures, the gap between member
curves and non-member curves represents the degree of the indis-
tinguishability. The larger the gap is, the more distinguishable the
confidence scores on members and non-members are. We report
the maximum gap and the average gap between the curves (i.e.,
without versus with defense) in the following.
- Figure 6 maximum gap: CIFAR10 (0.103 vs. 0.057), Purchase100
(0.412 vs. 0.164) and FaceScrub530 (0.416 vs. 0.264).
- Figure 6 average gap: CIFAR10 (0.004 vs. 0.002), Purchase100
(0.016 vs. 0.007) and FaceScrub530 (0.017 vs. 0.010).
- Figure 7 maximum gap: CIFAR10 (0.114 vs. 0.019), Purchase100
(0.201 vs. 0.058) and FaceScrub530 (0.418 vs. 0.129).
10
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Generalization error
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
CIFAR10
With defense
Without defense
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Generalization error
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
Purchase100
With defense
Without defense
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Generalization error
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
FaceScrub530
With defense
Without defense
Figure 4: The empirical CDF of the generalization error of the target classifierwith andwithout defense across different classes.
The generalization error ismeasured as the difference between the training and test accuracy of the target classifier. The y-axis
is the fraction of classes that have less generalization error than x-axis.
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(b) Test data
Figure 5: Distribution of the confidence score vectors of the
target classifier on the training data and test data of class 29
in the Purchase100 dataset. Each color represents one data
record.
- Figure 7 average gap: CIFAR10 (0.005 vs. 0.002), Purchase100
(0.015 vs. 0.003) and FaceScrub530 (0.017 vs. 0.005).
These results quantitatively and visibly show that our approach
can significantly reduce both maximum and average gaps between
the target classifier’s confidence in the correct class and prediction
uncertainty on members versus non-members. This, to some extent,
improves the indistinguishability of confidence scores.
Figure 5 visibly presents the confidence score vectors of the target
classifier on the training and test data from class 29 without and
with our defense. Without defense, the target classifier produces
a very high probability for class 29 on the training data. On the
test data, besides class 29, the probabilities for class 54 and 70
are also similarly high. This is where the target classifier makes
most mistakes on the test data. Besides, the target classifier spreads
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Figure 6: Distribution of the target classifier’s confidence in
predicting the correct class on members and non-members
of its training set.
the prediction probability across many classes which means the
prediction is sensitive to the input data.When our defense is applied,
the prediction probabilities on training data and test data show
similar patterns. For example, besides class 29, they are both high
on class 15, 24, 35 and 38. The probability of the test data is still
high on class 54 and 70 which is in line with our finding that our
defense introduces negligible classification accuracy loss. On the
other hand, by reshaping the confidence scores to concentrate on a
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Figure 7: Distribution of the target classifier’s prediction un-
certainty on members and non-members of its training set.
The uncertainty is measured as the normalized entropy of
the confidence score vector.
few classes rather than spreading probabilities across many classes,
our approach makes them less sensitive to input data, which is
helpful in mitigating the model inversion attack.
5.3 Comparison with Existing Defenses
Table 2 presents the comparison of different defense methods from
the utility, defense performance and efficiency aspects. We didn’t
perform the model inversion attack against the FaceScrub530 clas-
sifier protected by MemGuard because it took too long to train the
inversion model on the auxiliary CelebA dataset in limited time.
As it is shown, our approach introduces negligible utility loss
to all the three target classifiers, which outperforms Min-Max and
Model-Stacking. MemGuard is designed to guarantee no classifica-
tion accuracy loss and minimal confidence score distortion. There-
fore, it slightly outperforms our approach in terms of utility loss.
When the attacker performs model inversion attack, our approach
outperforms all the other defense methods with the largest inver-
sion error. Figure 3 (row 6-8) shows the inversion results against the
FaceScrub530 classifier protected by different defense methods. We
can see that the reconstructed facial images against our approach
are more vague with detailed facial features not recovered. For
membership inference attacks, our approach outperforms other
approaches in defending NSH attack on the FaceScrub530 dataset
and defending Mlleaks attack on the Purchase100 dataset. In other
attacks, the defense performance of our approach is comparable
with the best result among other approaches.
Efficiency. In our experiments, we trainmodels on a PC equipped
with four Titan XP GPUs with 12GBytes of graphic memory,128
GBytes of memory and an Intel Xeon E5-2678 CPU.We compare the
efficiency of different defense methods by measuring the training
time overhead and the test time overhead. Table 2 shows the com-
parison results. Our approach achieves significantly less training
time than other defense methods on the CIFAR10 and FaceScrub530
classifiers, which are relatively large and complicated neural net-
works and thus the efficiency of our approach has practical meaning.
The test time overhead of our approach is introduced by the com-
putation of a single forward pass of the purifier model. The average
overhead 1.70e-3 seconds per sample over the three datasets is
considered insignificant.
6 RELATEDWORK
Inference Attacks. The inference attacks against machine learn-
ing can be divided into model inference and data inference attacks.
In model inference attacks, an attacker could infer the parame-
ters [54], hyper-parameters [55], architecture [37] and functional-
ity [40] of a target model. In data inference attacks, the attacker aims
at inferring information about the data that the target model oper-
ates on. These attacks include membership inference attack [49],
model inversion attack (input inference) [14, 60], attribute infer-
ence [15, 58], statistics inference [2] and side-channel attack [57].
In this paper, we concentrate on data inference attacks, notably
membership inference attack and model inversion attack. Exist-
ing defense methods mainly focused on membership inference
attacks [24, 28, 35, 49]. Little has been studied about the model in-
version attack. Xiao et al. [59] studied the adversarial reconstruction
problem where they aim to prevent the latent representations from
being decoded into the original input data. To this end, they regu-
larized the encoder with an adversarial loss from a decoder. They
studied the face attribute prediction model which outputs 40 bi-
nary facial attributes. Our paper, on the contrary, studies black-box
classification models whose output is constrained by a probability
distribution wherein the values sum up to 1. Moreover, they did not
consider the adversarial scenario where the attacker has no access
to the same data distribution as the original training data.
General Membership Inference Attack. Membership infer-
ence attack is performed to determine whether a given data sample
is part of a target dataset. It is not limited to machine learning mod-
els. Homer et al. [21] proposed one of the first membership inference
attacks in the biomedical setting on genomic data. Some studies
also performed membership inference attacks on other biomedical
data such as MicroRNA [3] and DNA methylation [17]. Pyrgelis et
al. [45, 46] further showed that it is possible to perform member-
ship inference attack on location datasets as well. Shokri et al. [49]
performed membership inference attack in the machine learning
setting which is the same setting in this paper.
Secure & Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning. The un-
trusted access of machine learning models in the training or testing
phase is a direct threat to the security and privacy of machine
learning. A number of studies made use of trusted hardware and
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cryptographic computing to provide secure and privacy-preserving
training and use of machine learning models. These techniques
include homomorphic encryption, garbled circuits and secure multi-
party computation on private data [6, 10, 12, 29, 34, 43] and secure
computing using trusted hardware [25, 38]. Although these meth-
ods protect sensitive data from direct observation by the attacker,
they do not prevent information leakage via the model computation
itself which could be exploited by various inference attacks.
7 CONCLUSION
We propose a purification framework to defend data inference at-
tacks against machine learning including themodel inversion attack
and the membership inference attack. The framework purifies a
confidence score vector by removing the useful information that the
attacker could exploit. We design joint optimization objectives to
train the purification framework. The result is a purifier model that
takes the confidence score vector predicted by the target classifier as
input and outputs a purified version. In our extensive experiments,
we show that the purification framework is effective in mitigating
data inference attacks and imposes negligible utility loss.
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